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Valerie Bunce *
The Elusive Peace in the Former
Yugoslavia
Introduction
Bosnia-Herzegovina, once a republic within Yugoslavia and now a
fledgling state, has been engulfed in war for three years. Despite the terri-
ble human costs of the war-the loss of two hundred thousand lives
(mostly civilian) and the creation of approximately four million refu-
gees-and despite repeated peacemaking initiatives by a variety of interna-
tional institutions, including the United Nations, the European Union,
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an end to
this war in the very near future is unlikely.
Why has the war in Bosnia proven so resistant to peaceful resolution?
The most common answer to this question is that the conflict in Bosnia is
based on age-old ethnic hatred. As a result, the combatants have little
desire or capacity to lay down their arms. Moreover, since historically
rooted passions, not rational self-interest, drive the conflict, international
institutions have little influence.
This answer is based on an erroneous reading of the Bosnian war and
oversimplifies a very complex war by labelling it domestic, inter-ethnic,
and inevitable. Moreover, this interpretation is self-serving, enabling
international institutions, as well as western governments, to avoid any
responsibility for the wvar's outbreak or continuation.
This brief article presents a different explanation for the intractability
of the war in Bosnia. Part I begins with an analysis of the war's origins,
concentrating on specific developments within Yugoslavia and the interna-
tional system from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. The analysis corrects
historical misinterpretations in order to better understand the nature of
the wvar and the considerable difficulties involved in ending it. Part II
argues that none of the preconditions necessary for successful interna-
tional peacekeeping are present in Bosnia. The character of the war and
the character of international peacemaking efforts have worked together
to prolong the war and prevent its peaceful resolution.
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I. The Origins of the War
For the Yugoslav state, 1974, when the country adopted a new constitution,
was the beginning of the end.' The primary purpose of the new constitu-
tion was to provide a political and economic framework for the survival of
Yugoslavia after the death of its longtime leader, Marshall Tito (who died
six years later). The new constitution attempted to balance two goals:
state unity and fair representation for diverse national groups. These two
goals were accomplished by enhancing the role of the military as the
guardian of socialism and the Yugoslav state, balancing the diverse inter-
ests of the Yugoslav republics by granting them equal representation in all
national institutions,2 and devolving power from the central party and
state institutions to their equivalents in the republics.
In practice, these changes had several important consequences. The
first was to contribute to the growing role of the military as a major force
in Yugoslav domestic politics, a role which had been expanded in response
to the crisis of Croatian nationalism in the early 1970s. At the same time,
civilian control over the military was dispersed through a variety of
national institutions. This latter feature, plus the close ties which existed
between Serbia and the officer corps of the Yugoslav People's Army,
meant that the Yugoslav military was open to possible manipulation by
republic leaders, especially from Serbia.
A second consequence of the new constitution was weakening party
and state institutions at the national level by reallocating many of their
powers to the republics. This reduced national institutions to little more
than aggregations of representatives from the constituent republics. In
effect, each republic was encouraged to define its interests and policy pri-
orities, to build its own institutions, and to define terms of political and
economic debate, as well as to interpret and implement central-level pol-
icy directives individually. After 1974, indications of such decentralization
and diversity were the withering of the Yugoslav central bank, the increas-
ingly autarkic republican economies, and the increasingly different inter-
nal politics in Yugoslavia's six republics.
1. For a more detailed discussion of the issues presented in Part I, see Valerie
Bunce, The Yugoslav Experience in Comparative Perspective, in FROM PARTISANS TO PATRIOTS:
STATE AND Socir RELATIONS IN YuGOsLAVIA, 1945-1992 (Melissa Bokovoy et al. eds.,
forthcoming 1995); Valerie Bunce, State Collapse After State Socialism: A Comparison
of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, paper presented at the Conference
on Nationalism, Communism and Post-Communism, Cornell University (April 21,
1995) (on file with author); MIsHA GLEN y, THE FALL OF YUGOsLAVIA: THE THIRD BAL.
KAN WAR (1992); Steven L. Burg, The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis, in
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (Milton Esman & Shibley
Telhami eds., forthcoming 1995); JAMES Gow, LEGTMACY AND THE MIuTARY. THE
YuGosLAv CRIsIS (1992); STEVEN L. BURG, CONFLICT AND COHESION IN SOCIALIST YUGO.
sLAviA (1983); SUSAN L. WOODwARD, BALKAN TRAGEDr. CHAOS AND DISSOLTrrlON AFTER
THE COLD WAR (1995); Steven L. Burg, War or Peace: Nationalism, Democracy, and
American Foreign Policy in Post Communist Europe (1995) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
2. This had the effect of granting equal and national representation to major eth-
nic groups since republic boundaries were based largely on ethnic concentrations.
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Because the 1974 Constitution was built on the ethno-territorial struc-
ture of Yugoslav federalism, it heightened the prospects for inter-republic
and inter-ethnic conflict and for a stalemated national decision-making
process. Following the Soviet model developed in the 1920s, Yugoslavia
defined itself as a federal state with ethnically defined federal units.3
Thus, each republic had not only a specific ethnic complexion with pecu-
liar ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics, but also a variety of
other important distinctions, such as historical experience and socio-eco-
nomic development. The differences among the republics were differ-
ences in values as well as interests, and correlated with ethnic as well as
political-administrative distinctions.
These significant differences were especially relevant when the 1974
Constitution devolved power to the republics in an attempt to balance
diverse interests and prevent the dominance of any one ethno-territorial
unit. Tension existed not merely between the center and the semi-autono-
mous federal "states," but also between and within "states" still developing
autonomous identities.
4
The 1974 Constitution parcelled economic and political sovereignty
to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Mace-
donia. It also contributed to a stronger sense of national identity among
Slovenians, Croatians, Bosnians, Serbians, Montenegrins and Macedoni-
ans-that is, to constitutionally recognized ethnic groups. At the same
time, decentralization created the possibility of similar dynamics in the two
autonomous provinces attached administratively to Serbia and composed
of ethnic minority enclaves: Vojvodina (with its large Hungarian minor-
ity) and Kosovo (where Albanians constituted a majority of the
population).
These arrangements were sensible, given Yugoslavia's ethnic complex-
ity and the presence of other factors which worked to unify the system and
minimize conflict. One such factor was Marshall Tito, who functioned as
the hegemonic power within the aggregated republics. Another factor was
a robust economy, which allowed for some degree of reconciliation among
the republics' interests and minimized conflict among the communist par-
ties representing-and dominating-each republic. Finally, a confederal
Yugoslavia was functional as long as socialism provided a unifying ideology
and as long as the exit option, secession, was outside the realm of possible
political options.
However, beginning in the 1980s, a series of developments systemati-
cally eliminated each of these preconditions for the successful operation
3. In the 1960s, the Bosnians were added as a new ethnic group to the constituent
groups of Yugoslavia. They were primarily Serbs (though also many Croats) who had
converted to Islam during the Ottoman period. In this way, religious differences
(which in historical terms had always accompanied ethnic differences) were folded into
the notions of ethnicity, nation and territory in Yugoslavia.
4. The view that Yugoslavia had become an international system in microcosm is
found in PEDRO RAMET, NATIONAuSM AND FEDERALISM INYUGOSLAVIA, 1963-1983 (1984);
STEVEN L. BURG, CoNFLIcr AND COHESION IN SOCIALISTYUGOSLAVIA: PoLICAL DECISION
MAIMNG SINCE 1966 (1983).
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of the Yugoslav confederal model. As a result of these developments,
political power shifted from national institutions to the republics, and the
republics in turn developed the desire and the capacity to transform from
confederation members into independent states. The first of these devel-
opments was the death of Tito. His death created a political vacuum at the
center of the system, a condition hastened by the transformation of cen-
tral institutions into mere republican consortia and by the constitutionally
mandated rotation among the republics of leadership positions within the
central party and state institutions. Moreover, fears of instability and the
anti-nationalist purges of the 1970s in Croatia and Serbia (which weak-
ened reformist elements in these republics) allowed those within Serbia
and Croatia who rejected much needed economic and political reforms to
expand their power in the wake of Tito's death. It is not accidental that
Serbian politics became more hardline in the 1980s and that Serbian lead-
ers demonstrated their emphasis on nationalism and territorial expansion
by imposing greater control over Kosovo through violent and administra-
tive measures. It is also not accidental that the communist party in Croatia
maintained its conservative stance, did not embrace nationalism (because
of Tito's attack on Croatian nationalism in the early 1970s), and rejected
reform while allowing the right wing opposition to appropriate the ques-
tion of national existence.
A second problem in the early 1980s was that Yugoslavia-like many
Third World countries during this period-was burdened with extensive
hard currency debts. This led the international financial community to
impose considerable pressures on the Yugoslav state to introduce stringent
economic measures. These economic measures led to a fall in Yugoslav
per capita income throughout the 1980s and to more frequent strikes and
demonstrations. They also exposed the weakness of the central govern-
ment, with its inability to implement needed economic measures or to
control republican economies. Furthermore, the dire economic situation
opened the republics' communist parties to conflicts between reformers
and hardliners and generated pressure on communist leaders in the
republics to embrace nationalism as a substitute for an increasingly bank-
rupt socialism.
Economic pressure also set in motion a constitutional war among the
republics, with the richer republics supporting economic reform and
decentralization and the poorer republics (because of their dependence
on redistributive subsidies) supporting a recentralization of the political
and economic system.5 By 1987, the lines of battle were drawn with the
Serbian leadership, after rejecting reform and embracing nationalism, fac-
ing the reform-minded, pro-decentralization and increasingly nationalist
Slovenian leadership. In this sense, the violent war between the republics
in Yugoslavia, which began with Slovenia's, and then Croatia's, declara-
tions of independence, followed by the Yugoslav People's Army actions
5. See WOODWARD, supra note 1.
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against Slovenia and then Croatia, was prefigured by a constitutional war
among the republics that had begun years earlier.
By the end of the 1980s, socialist ideology had lost its capacity to unite
the Yugoslav republics. In part, this was because the economic and polit-
ical crisis had delegitimated socialism, which, among other things, hadjus-
tified itself in terms of its capacity to stabilize Yugoslavia politically and
economically. However, international factors were also crucial in ending
socialist ideological hegemony, namely, the introduction of the Gorbachev
reforms and their dramatic impact on Eastern Europe in 1989. In 1990,
without the Soviet threat (which Gorbachev had put to complete rest with
a Belgrade speech in 1988), and with the obvious bankruptcy of socialism,
the communist party of Yugoslavia formally disintegrated into its republi-
can parts. A struggle for power within each of the republics followed.
This struggle took different forms in each republic, depending on the eth-
nic homogeneity of the population, the strength of the liberal opposition,
and the position of the communists on the questions of reform, national-
ism, and republican sovereignty. The differences in each republic led not
only to different political outcomes in each republic in the 1990 elections,
but also to the impossibility of resuscitating a unified Yugoslav state. Yugo-
slavia had become an irrelevant territorial configuration.
The final factor leading to the violent dismemberment of the Yugo-
slav state was the response of the international community to the crisis in
Yugoslavia in 1990-1991. To put the matter succinctly, international
actions made a bad situation worse. Generally, the collapse of interna-
tional order following the end of the cold war had left the western alliance
in considerable disarray. There was no longer an international order that
could enforce existing state boundaries in Europe, and there was no
longer a common enemy to facilitate reconciliation among alliance
members.
Moreover, power in Europe was in the process of being redefined,
especially given the unification of Germany. Not only were Europeans
divided, but international institutions, established during the Cold War,
disagreed about mission definitions and particular member interests.
Because the Yugoslav crisis was so complex and involved the first socialist
state to disintegrate, it exposed all of these problems. Essentially, the dis-
order of Europe after the Cold War was displayed on the field of a rapidly
disintegrating Yugoslav state.
Specifically, two international actions early in the crisis contributed to
the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. The first was the American and West-
ern European commitment in 1990 and early 1991 to the continuation of
the Yugoslav state. This played into the aggressive designs of the Serbian
leadership, which had voiced support for the continuation of Yugoslavia,
and enhanced the prospect of a violent end to Yugoslavia through Serbian
deployment of the Yugoslav People's Army against irredentist Slovenia and
Croatia. If western powers had decided, instead, to work together for a
peaceful dismemberment of the state, the deconstruction of Yugoslavia
might not have been violent.
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The second international action was Germany's pressure on its allies
in 1991 to recognize rapidly the self-proclaimed Slovenian and Croatian
states. In doing so, the Germans and their western allies made two serious
blunders. First, they left an armed and frightened Serbian minority in
Croatia without any constitutional or international guarantee of full equal-
ity in the new Croatian state. Second, they placed multinational Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the impossible position of either remaining tied to a rump
Yugoslavia dominated by nationalist Serbia, or declaring independence
and inviting a war involving Serbs, Croats, and Muslims within Bosnia.
Other factors within Bosnia added to the complexity. The Serbian
and Croatian communities within Bosnia were armed. Both had gone rel-
atively far in defining themselves as independent communities, and Serbia
and Croatia supported both in their demands for autonomy. Despite their
seeming animosity toward each other, as revealed in the war in Croatia,
the leaders of Serbia and Croatia in fact had found it relatively easy to
meet with each other before the Bosnian war officially began to decide on
a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between their two states. This division
would resolve the awkward geography of the Croatian state, expand the
size and the percentage of the Croatian population within Croatia, and
solve the Serbian problem of a sizeable Serbian population existing
outside rump Yugoslavia. Not accidentally, it would also strengthen the
domestic political support for Slobodan Milosevic, the elected leader of
Serbia, and Franjo Tudjman, the elected leader of Croatia who both
claimed political power on the basis of nationalism.
How then are we to understand the road to war in Bosnia? The fol-
lowing generalizations are appropriate. First, it is possible that the
breakup of Yugoslavia was inevitable, especially given the collapse of state
socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War international
order. It is significant that every federal socialist state has divided since
the collapse of state socialism. This is testimony notjust to the importance
of the Cold War order in the defense of existing state boundaries in
Europe, but also to the ways in which state socialism, when organized into
ethno-territorial federalism, created the preconditions for the develop-
ment of separable nations and states. As such, the division of Yugoslavia,
like the division of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, was the result
of the interaction between two factors: the development of multiple
nations and states as a consequence of ethno-territorial federalism and the
expanded opportunities for secession produced by a domestic and inter-
national order in simultaneous transition.
Second, though the end of Yugoslavia may have been inevitable, the
violence of its demise was not. This follows from two observations. One is
that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the other two federal states in
the region, broke up without the violence witnessed in Yugoslavia. 6 Specif-
6. In the Soviet case, the actual breakup of the state was peaceful, despite the
attempted coup d'etat launched by conservatives and segments of the military in August
of 1991. The subsequent violence was between and within former republics which are
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ically, while the Serbian republic launched a war against the seceding
states, the Russian and Czech republics-the dominant republics within
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia-did not.
The other observation is that there were specific domestic and inter-
national factors which explain the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
Domestically, these factors included constitutional reforms, the internal
role of the Yugoslav People's Army, Yugoslavia's economic difficulties, the
growing role of nationalism in Yugoslav politics and economics, and the
presence of a significant Serbian community outside Serbia. International
factors included the pressure exerted by the International Monetary Fund
and the actions taken early in the conflict by Germany, the European
(dis)Union, and the United States. While domestic actors, such as ambi-
tious regional politicians using nationalism to build support, bear some
responsibility for the violent dismemberment of Yugoslavia, the interna-
tional community must share the responsibility.
Third, one must recognize that the war in Bosnia was not caused by
ethnic strife, but has an ethnic character as a consequence of these specific
domestic and international developments. Most striking about the factors
leading to the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and now Bosnia is the way in
which they contributed to inter-ethnic differentiation, distrust and con-
flict, especially since these peoples had lived together in relative harmony
for forty-five years. Specific events, not historical grudges, explain the war
in Bosnia and its particularly ethnic character.
Finally, while the war in Bosnia formally began with aggression by the
armed Serbian minority in Bosnia against the new Bosnian state, the war is
not reducible to the simple equation of the Serbian minority fighting the
Bosnian government. The war has also involved fighting between the Cro-
atian minority within Bosnia and the Bosnian governmental forces,
though they periodically ally. Because the war involves remnants of the
Yugoslav People's Army, the Serbian government, the Serbian minority in
Croatia, and the Croatian government, it has been fully internationalized
from the start. Thus, the war in Bosnia is not simply a civil war, but also
an international war.
II. Successful Peacemaking and Peacekeeping
While international institutions have contributed in important ways to the
outbreak of war in Bosnia, they have also tried to find ways to end this war
via the numerous peacemaking missions launched by such organizations
as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. These initiatives have produced a
number of peace proposals, some short-lived ceasefires and, in the case of
humanitarian aid sponsored by the United Nations, some reduction in the
human cost of the war. However, what they have not created is a peace
plan acceptable to all the warring sides.
now states, rather than violence committed by the center or the dominant republic
against the secessionist periphery.
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Why have international institutions failed to make, let alone keep, the
peace in Bosnia? One begins to answer this question by developing a sys-
tematic inventory of the conditions under which international institutions,
such as the United Nations, function as effective peacemakers and
peacekeepers. There are three such conditions. First, the conflict must
evidence some structure: the warring parties must be limited in number
and the leaders of the warring parties must be in a strong position to speak
for and to control the actions of the groups they represent. Second, the
parties to the conflict must have sufficient incentives to lay down their
arms. In practice, this means that they mustjudge termination of the con-
flict to be more advantageous than its continuation. Finally, international
institutions must have sufficient resources to implement their peacekeep-
ing efforts. These resources include a monopoly over the peace process,
the full support of powerful international actors, the trust of the combat-
ants and the availability of sufficient money and troops to enforce peace
accords.
In the Bosnian case, none of these conditions exist. The first condi-
tion, structure within the conflict, is absent. As already noted, the Bosnian
conflict is extraordinarily complex, including not just the three groups of
combatants within Bosnia, but also the Serbian minority in Croatia, the
Croatian government, and the former Yugoslav government. Thus, a min-
imum of six groups are involved in the conflict. If the Serbian and Yugo-
slav governments are considered distinct and if the former Yugoslav
military is included, the number of groups increases. In addition, the con-
flict involves three adjoining states, or states-in-the-making: Bosnia, Croa-
tia, and rump Yugoslavia.
Also contributing to the lack of structure are the increasingly differ-
ent interests and semi-independent behavior of the many groups involved.
For example, as the war has progressed it has become apparent that the
political leadership of the Serbian government exerts only limited influ-
ence on the actions of the Serbian minority in Bosnia and Croatia. More-
over, the Serbian governmental leadership, once convinced of the
advantages of encouraging the Bosnian war, has become more skeptical as
the costs of war have wreaked havoc on the Serbian economy. Other fac-
tors which have added to the Serbian skepticism are the pressures rump
Yugoslavia has felt to rejoin the international community and Slobodan
Milosevic's perception of a "Greater Serbia" as a threat to his continued
dominance within Serbian and Yugoslav politics. These concerns, how-
ever, are not very relevant to the calculations made by the Serbian minori-
ties in Bosnia and Croatia, and the result has been growing tensions
among the three Serbian participants in the Bosnian war.
In addition, the leaders of these different groups have limited control
over their respective constituents. This is partially due to the decentral-
ized nature of this war and partially because the political leader of each
group must balance the interests of his constituents with the pressures
exerted by other actors in the conflict. For example, there are important
divisions among the Bosnian Serb combatants on the ground, the Bosnian
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Serb parliament in Pale, and the acknowledged leader of the Bosnian
Serbs, Radovan Karadzic.
The second condition for successful peacemaking and peacekeeping
also is missing from the Bosnian situation. Among the three "domestic"
combatants in this war, there are few incentives to stop fighting. The Bos-
nian government harbors anger that the war against Bosnia has been
unjust, fears that the current division of Bosnia will produce an unviable
state, and hopes that the international community, especially the United
States, will eventually act to reverse significant territorial losses. These
considerations and perceptions encourage the Bosnian government to
continue the fight.
The Serbian minority fighting in Bosnia believes that territories
already won should remain in Serbian control, as suggested by various
international proposals, and not be reduced in any significant way. Addi-
tionally, the future relationship among the Serbian enclaves in Bosnia,
Croatia, and Serbia is uncertain. These considerations pressure the Ser-
bian minority in Bosnia to continue the war in the hope of solidifying
territorial gains and thereby creating the basis for either a stable territorial
division of Bosnia or a "Greater Serbia."
Finally, the Croatian minority in Bosnia has incentives to continue the
war. If the Serbian minority continues to dominate the battle, the Croa-
tian minority may have to take what it can in a rapidly disappearing state.
In addition, if, due to international support or victories in the field, the
Bosnian government proves to be stronger than it has been thus far, the
Croatian minority will be encouraged to ally with the Bosnian forces and
thereby share the fruits of the Bosnian governmental resurgence. Concur-
rently, the Croatian government is exerting pressure on the Croatian
minority in Bosnia to continue the war-either with or against the Bos-
nian governmental forces. In summary, the domestic and international
aspects of this war have thus far worked together to encourage combatants
to continue the fight.
The final condition for effective peacekeeping and peacemaking also
is not met: international institutions lack the necessary resources to make
a durable peace agreement. In the course of this conflict, no single inter-
national institution or international actor has been able to establish a
monopoly on the peace process. This reflects the disorder of the interna-
tional community following the end of the Cold War. It also reflects the
fact that domestic pressures on politicians in the United States and
Europe (including Russia) have led to inconsistent foreign policies and
the renewed impact of geo-strategic concerns which influence foreign pol-
icies in the European states. As a result, no single international mediator,
whether an individual, state, or international institution, has enjoyed the
confidence of all sides. Indeed, the parties to the conflict have played
mediators and peace proposals against each other. This, in conjunction
with the continued and heated debates within the western alliance about
the provision of humanitarian forces in Bosnia and the future provision of
troops for peacekeeping in the event of a peace agreement, has made it
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clear that international resources cannot support a durable solution to the
Bosnian conflict.
Conclusions
It is hardly surprising that the end of the Yugoslav state has produced war
in Slovenia, Croatia, and now in Bosnia. A number of domestic and inter-
national developments worked together to produce a violent end to the
Yugoslav state. At the same time, the necessary conditions for successful
international resolution of this conflict are not evident. The conflict is
multi-layered and blurs the boundary between domestic and international
war. As a result, the necessary structure for mediation of the conflict is
absent. Moreover, the structure of the war and the interventions of the
international community have given the combatants few incentives to
work together to terminate hostilities. Finally, international mediators are
inept at producing a viable peace agreement. They have worked at cross-
purposes in either ending hostilities or structuring a long-term peace
agreement. Ultimately, the war in Bosnia is testimony, among other
things, to the ways in which interaction between domestic and interna-
tional pressures can not only produce an outbreak of violence, but also
continue it.
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